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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, HATE
SPEECH LAWS, AND THE DOUBLE-SIDED
NATURE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Adrienne Stone*
The essays to which we are responding take the long and
rather well-worn debate about hate speech in new directions.
Weinstein’s central claim, which Waldron rejects, is that hate
speech laws can undermine the legitimacy of the legal system as a
whole and of particular “downstream” laws, such as laws
prohibiting racial discrimination.
I found three features of this debate especially eye-catching.
The first is Weinstein’s reliance on the concept of viewpoint
discrimination. As a comparativist of freedom of speech, it is
always striking to see an aspect of First Amendment law invoked
as a core principle of freedom of speech, given that in its aversion
to viewpoint discrimination (like much else) First Amendment
law is highly unusual.1 In other countries – like Canada and
Australia – viewpoint discrimination is relevant to the determining
the law’s validity but does not carry anything like the weight it
does in First Amendment law.2
* Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor, Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian
Laureate Fellow, Director of the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies,
Melbourne Law School.
1. For a discussion of the First Amendment in the comparative context, see
Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Adrienne Stone, The Comparative
Constitutional Law of Freedom of Expression, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2011).
2. In Canadian law, if a law has the purpose of limiting expression it is, by virtue of
that purpose alone, taken to infringe section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The need for a factual inquiry into the effects of the law is thus obviated.
However, this finding does not invalidate the law, rather the Court proceeds to apply
section 1 of the Charter to determine whether the law is reasonably necessary in a free and
democratic society. See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 972. In Australian law, the
High Court of Australia has adopted a distinction between a “direct” and “incidental”
burden on freedom of expression that appears at least partially to track the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws. Hogan v Hinch, [2011] 243 CLR 506,
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Second, it is worth noting the apparently confined nature of
the disagreement. Weinstein accepts Waldron’s position that
much of what qualifies as hate speech is of no value to public
debate because in stable and mature democracies the
commitment to elemental matters of racial and sexual equality
and religious tolerance is not the subject of “serious or
considerable contestation.”3
Third, the debate, apparently at least, puts aside two often
dominant questions: whether hate speech causes harm (the harm
question) and whether the power to impose or enforce hate
speech law will inevitably be used to protect government interests,
favour the powerful and disadvantage the vulnerable (the abuse
of power question). Weinstein accepts that hate speech causes
certain harms and aims his arguments, for the most part at least,
at the narrow kind of law that Waldron wishes to defend. (Laws,
like section 18(1) of the Public Order Act (UK) that are directed
at highly vituperative kinds of bigoted speech).
Leaving these questions to one side sharpens this debate by
avoiding the need to engage with the resolve the messy questions
of fact. It also raises the stakes: Weinstein defence purports to
apply even though the speech protected is worthless and even if a
law is well targeted and competently administered law. It
apparently yields a very strong defence of freedom of speech.
However, I am not convinced that the question of legitimacy
of hate speech laws can be resolved in this way. Viewpoint
discrimination is not so obviously inimical to equal political
participation as Weinstein suggests. On the contrary, a failure to
enact hate speech laws may, consistently with Weinstein’s
account, undermine the legitimacy of the legal system generally
and the application of individual laws to the victims of hate
speech. Thus the argument from political legitimacy illustrates
how the values underlying speech can be wielded both for and

para 95. While this classification may lead to a stricter form of review, it does not amount
to a presumption against invalidity. On the contrary, a flexible proportionality-style test
remains the dominant approach. McCloy v N.S.W., [2015] 257 CLR 158; see also Adrienne
Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure, 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 668
(1999).
3. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. (2017).
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against the protection of speech, a phenomenon I have elsewhere
described as the “double-sided” nature of freedom of speech.4
Precisely for these reasons, as I have also argued elsewhere,
the messy realities to which the harm question and the abuse of
power question direct us cannot be easily avoided.5 Nor can
Weinstein so neatly avoid questions as to the nature and worth of
hateful speech. On this point, Weinstein’s position is more
complex than it first appears. Although he apparently accepts that
much hate speech is of no value in public debate, he also believes
that some of the expression caught by hate speech laws – notably
speech motivated by religious belief - is worthy of protection
precisely because it debates matters that are the subject of
reasonable disagreement. If true, hate speech is a more variable
and complex phenomenon than the argument otherwise admits.
Although for the most part it appears that Weinstein defends hate
speech even when—as in the case of speech denying basic racial
and gender equality—there can be no reasonable case for its
worth. However, there are points—in relation to religiously
motived speech—at which the argument appears to rely on
reasonable disagreement about the worth of speech to make the
case for its protection.
1. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY: THE ARGUMENT
Weinstein’s reliance on the concept of viewpoint
discrimination6 arises in response to Waldron’s point that hate
speech laws that are targeted only at the most vituperative kind
of hate speech have limited effect. They limit speech that is widely
understood to be worthless and leave open other ways for the
“propositional content” of this hateful speech to be expressed.7
4. Adrienne Stone, The Canadian Constitutional Law of Freedom of Expression, in
CANADA IN THE WORLD: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION (Richard Albert & David R. Cameron eds., Cambridge University Press)
(forthcoming 2017).
5. Id.
6. This rule is an aspect of a more general prohibition in First Amendment law on
“content-based” laws regulating speech. Within the general rule, a law involving viewpoint
discrimination is regarded as the most problematic form of a content-based law and
therefore even expression within “low value categories” is protected from viewpoint
discrimination. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
7. One question aired, which I will put aside, is whether it is correct to treat laws
such as Waldron defends as viewpoint based (given that they are not targeted at viewpoints
per se but at the harmful consequences of hateful speech).
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Weinstein’s reply is that because hate speech laws are
viewpoint-based they “uniquely implicate the fundamental
interest in governing as a political equal of those whose speech is
suppressed by the restriction.”8 At another point, he expands:
[V]iewpoint-based speech restrictions on public discourse
infringe the fundamental interest in equal political
participation of those who want to express these forbidden
views. To the extent that such censorship prevents people from
expressing what they believe is best for society, it is insulting;
in so far the speech restriction impairs their ability to promote
or protect their own self-interest, it is also fundamentally
unfair.9

In giving this justification of the rule10 against viewpoint
discrimination Weinstein takes a somewhat novel turn. More
typically, the rule against viewpoint discrimination has been
justified on grounds that viewpoint discrimination distorts public
debate; interferes with citizen’s capacity property to inform
themselves; and, because state regulation on grounds of viewpoint
poses the greatest risk that it will attempt to reinforce its own
interests or to reflect the lawmaker’s mistaken view of the truth
or value of a message.11
2. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY: THE REPLY
Although novel, this justification for the rule against
viewpoint discrimination runs into several objections. The most
fundamental is that hate speech laws further, rather than
undermine, political legitimacy. Alexander Brown, who deals
with this argument in most detail, argues that hate speech laws
ensure that people are accorded dignity in public debate, or at
least that the state uses measures it has available to it to provide
them with an assurance that their dignity will be respected.12

8. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 546.
9. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 540.
10. Strictly, the ‘rule’ is a strong presumption, though one that is rarely rebutted.
11. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
12. Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to
James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 599 (2017). For other discussion in this
Symposium, see Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Reply to James
Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2017) and Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech—
Definitions & Empirical Evidence, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 619 (2017).
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Consequently, a failure to enact hate speech laws may itself
impose a cost on political legitimacy.
Weinstein’s response to this relies in part on the difference
between specific and systemic legitimacy. The diminution in
legitimacy that Brown identifies is “systemic.” It is the legitimacy
of “the legal system” that has been diminished, not the obligation
to obey or the morality of enforcement of a particular law. It is
this latter kind of illegitimacy with which Weinstein is principally
concerned. He objects to the state forcing “dissenters” to comply
with a law with which they disagree, in circumstances where their
capacity to express their dissenting ideas is circumscribed by hate
speech laws. Weinstein concludes that this form of “specific”
illegitimacy is not commensurate with, and therefore not offset
by, the systemic illegitimacy of which Brown writes.
Waldron and Brown have both offered responses to this step
in the argument. Waldron doubts that illegitimacy can, as a
general matter, be attributed to specific “downstream” laws as
Weinstein supposes. Brown argues that fundamental principles of
justice justify the application of “downstream” laws to individuals
who transgress them, even if those individuals have been
prevented from articulating hateful and discriminatory views.
Without doubting the first two responses, a third may be
available. If the supposed diminution in legitimacy by hate speech
laws can attach to specific laws in their application to individuals,
why could the reverse not be true? That is, why could not the
failure the enact hate speech laws also undermine the legitimacy
of specific “downstream” laws and thus undermine the
justification for applying those laws to specific individuals?
To make this point, we need to revisit the question of the
harm hate speech causes and to consider directly the question of
whether hate speech “silences.” If we take seriously that claim, it
might interfere with the capacity of its victims to be equal citizens
in much the same way as Weinstein claims that hate speech laws
operate.13 If hate speech victims are silenced, it seems that hate
speech undermines the capacity of its victims to oppose laws that
have specific application to them. Indeed, Weinstein
13. See Jennifer Hornsby, Speech Acts and Pornography, in THE PROBLEM OF
PORNOGRAPHY (Susan Dwyer ed., 1995); Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable
Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 293 (1992). On the question of empirical support for this claim,
see Gelber, supra note 12; Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Evidencing the Harms
of Hate Speech, 22 SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016).
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acknowledges this much positing the instance of an indigenous
population unable, because of their vilification, effectively to
argue in public debate for accommodations of their religious
traditions. Katharine Gelber provides another illustration arguing
that same-sex attracted people may be unable fully to participate
in public debate in opposition to laws prohibiting same sex
marriage, yet those laws apply to deprive them of the right to
marry. The cases reveal an equally strong case argument that it is
unfair and insulting to subject the victims of hate speech to laws
on which they have not had a fair opportunity to express their
views.
3. REVISITING THE HARM QUESTION AND THE
ABUSE QUESTION
Among the most obvious responses to the arguments I have
just made are as follows: First it might be doubted that hate speech
“silences” in the way I have suggested. Second, a distinction might
be drawn between silencing by the state’s act and silencing where
the state fails to address the cumulative effect of the speech of
others.
A full treatment of these objections requires more by way of
analysis than I can give them here. Moreover, not all the questions
they raise are susceptible of empirical investigation. The question
of whether hate speech can “silence” is in part a question about
the nature of speech and its relationship to action.14 The question
of whether a state failure to prevent silencing is equivalent to state
action raises difficult questions about the nature of rights.
(Freedom of speech is usually – but not universally - conceived of
as a negative and vertical right, which entails that it is exercisable
only against the state and acts as a shield against interference
rather than as an entitlement to some form of state response.)
But in addition, questions of fact are deeply implicated in
both inquiries. Rae Langton concludes her famous essay on the
silencing effect of pornography by noting unresolved empirical
questions. On her argument, the power of speech to silence

14.

Langton, supra note 13.
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depends in part of the authority of the speaker in the relevant
domain.15 As she concludes:
These are not really questions to be settled from the
philosopher’s armchair. To answer them one needs to know
about the role pornographers occupy as authoritative speakers
about the facts, or supposed facts, of sex.16

The same can be said about “silencing” on the other side of
the ledger. The extent to which hate speakers are truly “silenced”
by a hate speech law will depend upon many features of the law
targeting hateful speech including the degree to which speakers
can express their views in other ways as well as the mechanisms
for its enforcement, the remedies or penalties that it imposes.
Similarly, although not entirely an empirical question,17 the
question of whether the silencing caused by hate speech should be
addressed by law in part depends questions about the propensity
of governments (including prosecutorial authorities and courts) to
overstep their powers, selectively enforce laws, or otherwise
misuse power in a way that undermines or frustrate any legitimate
role for hate speech laws.
4. REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT?
Weinstein calls for more attention to these empirical
questions (especially the question of silencing) but he also
concludes that in the absence of evidence there is good reason to
favour freedom of speech. First, he says, the silencing of “hate
speech” laws is certain whereas the silencing effect of hate speech
is merely putative.18 More fundamentally, he insists that we treat
speakers in this situation equally, even in the face of evidence as
to silencing:
[E]ven if it could be definitively shown that bigoted speech
prevented others from participating in public discourse, it is not
clear what principle would justify shutting up A (or a group of

15. Id. at 312. (questioning whether pornography “is authoritative for those hearers
in the domain of speech about sex . . . people, men, boys, who . . . want to know which
moves in the sexual game are legitimate.”).
16. Id.
17. I have elsewhere suggested that positions on this question, in part, depend on
assumptions and commitments that are not empirically derived in any systematic way but
constructions of a constitutional culture. See Stone, infra note 23.
18. Although, as I have just argued both silencing claims require further
investigation. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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As) so that B (or a group of Bs) can speak. Or put in terms of
political legitimacy, why should A’s sense of alienation and
lack of identification with the state be of lesser concern than
B’s?19

In this respect Weinstein position is in tension with other
aspects of the argument. First, Weinstein writes as if there is
neutral position in which no party is silenced. But if the silencing
effect is real, as he is prepared to assume, then we have a choice
between either silencing the hate speaker or the victim. (The
question he poses could equally be reversed: “why should B’s
sense of alienation and lack of identification with the state be of
lesser concern than A’s?”) If he is truly prepared to accept the
claims of silencing, there is no way of avoiding the dilemma. If
Weinstein’s view is that silencing by the state is more problematic
than silencing by virtue of private action, then that position needs
to be justified.
Second, the argument for treating all hate speakers and their
victims equally appears to belie his first position as to moral worth
of hate speech. Weinstein agrees that elemental commitments to
racial and sexual equality and religious tolerance are beyond
contest. However, as the argument develops it appears that his
central concern is that individuals not be denied the opportunity
to express their views on matters about which there can be
reasonable disagreement.20 It is this reason that the illustrations
given in the second part of the paper all involve questions speech
critical of homosexuality and anti-Islamic speech, matters on
which there is “a close moral question, pitting fundamental liberty
interests . . . against each other.”21 This aspect of Weinstein’s
argument appears to narrow his claim in ways that are not clearly
acknowledged. If the objection from legitimacy applies only
where speech on matters of reasonable disagreement is
prohibited, then we need an account from Weinstein as to where
reasonable disagreement arises and why. Moreover, the argument
should acknowledge a realm (where reasonable disagreement is
absent) in which it does not apply.

19. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 579-80 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at 539 (“[W]here the morality of a law cannot just be reasonably questioned
but where its moral status is both contestable and highly contentious the lack of an
opportunity to participate can have grave consequences for political legitimacy.”).
21. Id. at 571.
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Finally, it is no answer to these arguments to reassert that
political legitimacy requires that all citizens are able to participate
in public debate regardless of their viewpoint. For one thing, it
does not resolve the dilemma. Members of affected groups are
likely to be the most motivated, insightful and effective advocates
for their points of view and therefore hate speech can reasonably
be supposed to silence in a viewpoint discriminatory way. Indeed,
the viewpoint discriminatory effect of this silencing may be
magnified in comparison with hate speech laws. If hate speech
truly “silences” its victims, it does not preserve alternative ways
for those victims to express the “propositional content” of their
views.
But in any event, the question we have been considering is
why viewpoint discrimination should be though to undermine
political legitimacy. I hope to have shown, along with others, that
enforcing viewpoint neutrality by precluding hate speech laws
could have costs to legitimacy equal to and as specific in their
application as the costs Weinstein attributes to viewpoint
discriminatory hate speech laws. If this is true, there is no reason,
in the absence of evidence on silencing, to err on the side of
freedom of speech unless Weinstein contradicts his earlier
acceptance (for the purposes of argument) of the silencing effect.
5. CONCLUSION: THE DOUBLE-SIDED NATURE OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
This debate about the legitimacy of hate speech laws has, in
the end, a familiar rhythm. It is a constant feature of debates
about freedom of speech that the values that apparently underlie
it can be wielded both for and against the right. It is, for instance,
especially evident in the comparative scholarly dialogue about the
protection of hate speech in Canadian law and under the First
Amendment. Typically, the decisions of Canadian Supreme Court
upholding hate speech laws are explained as revealing
fundamental and distinctive Canadian constitutional values of
“equality” and “multiculturalism” by discouraging discrimination
and racial violence; counteracting silencing; and protecting
cultural identity and an individual’s capacity to take part in the
communal life of cultural groups.22 I have elsewhere explored how
22. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 149 (1982); WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 14 (1995).
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First Amendment inspired accounts of freedom of speech rely on
equality and multicultural diversity as values for protecting
speech, and in particular for protecting hate speech.23
This debate on legitimacy and hate speech shows us yet
another way in which the values underlying freedom of speech can
militate for and against freedom of speech. Moreover, it
demonstrates that satisfactory resolution of the argument
requires close engagement with matters of fact. It seems unlikely
that the harm question and the abuse of power question can be
entirely avoided. Nor can we avoid distinguishing more carefully
amongst kinds of hate speech by identifying where (if at all) it
expresses reasonable disagreement and where it does not. For all
its illumination, this debate should encourage philosophers and
legal scholars to engage seriously and systematically24 with the
fine detail of what hate speech is, how it is regulated, how those
laws operate in practice and the evidence as to what hate speech
does to its victims.

23. See Stone, supra note 4; see also Adrienne Stone, How To Think about the
Problem of Hate Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND HATE SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA
(Katharine Gelber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007).
24. Weinstein’s discussion of hate speech laws in a number of European jurisdictions
is highly informative, but it principally illustrates how many hate speech laws go much
further than the narrow form of hate speech law that Waldron would defend. Additionally,
Katharine Gelber points to its limitations as a systematic study of hate speech laws in
operation.

